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Abstract—Today, Internet of Things (IoT) implements an
ecosystem where a panoply of interconnected devices collect
data from physical environments and supply them to processing
services, on top of which cloud-based applications are built and
provided to mobile end users. The undebatable advantages
of smart IoT systems clash with the need of a secure and
trustworthy environment. In this paper, we propose a service-
based methodology based on blockchain and smart contracts
for trustworthy evidence collection at the basis of a trustwor-
thy IoT assurance evaluation. The methodology balances the
provided level of trustworthiness and its performance, and is
experimentally evaluated using Hyperledger fabric blockchain.
Keywords-Assurance Evaluation, Blockchain, IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) can be defined as “the networked
interconnection of everyday objects, equipped with ubiqui-
tous intelligence” [1]. The existence of billions of cheap
and resource-constrained devices connected to the Internet
introduces fundamental risks that can threaten users’ life and
personal sphere. A wealth of services in different domains,
such as smart vehicles, smart buildings, e-health, are dis-
tributed on the basis of data collected by devices. In this
context, assurance evaluation is fundamental to guarantee
the correct behavior of the whole system and its devices [2].
Here, we use the term assurance in a wider sense to mean
the technical judgment that a service, process, or device
satisfies some properties. The implicit assumption is that
data have a sufficient level of trustworthiness to create
information, and in turn knowledge and wisdom [3]. This
assumption is however not sound when a plethora of devices
are used to collect data, and might bring to scenarios where
wrong evidence results in wrong decisions and, in turn,
untrusted services/applications. We argue that without an
open, protocol-neutral baseline solution for IoT assurance,
fundamental risks will become even worse.
Research on IoT-based systems assurance is however at an
early stage, and mainly focused on defining new assurance
architectures for IoT. Ardagna et al. [4] first discussed
challenges in the design and development of assurance
techniques for IoT, proposing a conceptual framework and
architecture for IoT security assurance evaluation. Sato et
al. [5] investigated the problem of trust establishment in
IoT and proposed an architecture for evaluating “area-
wise trust”, where the trust level considers device identi-
fication, monitoring of device behaviors, device connection
processes and protocols. Traditional assurance techniques [2]
are however affected by important limitations when targeting
complex IoT systems as follows.
• Hybrid systems. Assurance techniques do not target
hybrid systems, where cloud systems at the center are
connected via edge networks to smart devices at the
periphery and no clear perimeters exist.
• Untrusted (micro) providers. Hybrid systems rely on
data continuously collected by a multitude of devices,
which are intrinsically unreliable and under the control
of many untrusted providers.
• Trustworthy evidence. Traditional assurance is often
driven by untrusted/unverified evidence that is accepted
on the basis of the provider reputation.
The need of collecting trustworthy evidence clearly
emerges in the above challenges. This need has initially
dealt with in the context of forensics science by defining a
systematic and reliable methodology for evidence collection
and analysis [6]. Some solutions based on blockchain have
been also proposed to guarantee availability, integrity, and
verifiability of collected evidence [7], [8], [9].
In this paper, we fill in the above gaps by providing a
novel, service-based methodology for trustworthy evidence
collection at the basis of a trustworthy assurance evaluation
of IoT processes and systems. Our methodology is provided
at different granularities, depending on specific performance
requirements, from simple trustworthy evidence collection,
to trustworthy evidence aggregation, and provable evidence-
based automation. It is based on blockchain and smart
contract to guarantee collection of reliable evidence whose
integrity is proven over time. Differently from existing
solutions, our methodology links the evidence to the way
in which it is collected and aggregated, or a decision based
on it is taken.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our
reference scenario. Section III describes the architecture of
our trustworthy evidence collection approach discussed in
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Figure 1. Evidence collection architecture
Section IV. Section V experimentally evaluates the perfor-
mance of our approach. Section VI gives our conclusions.
II. REFERENCE SCENARIO
Our reference scenario considers smart multi-family resi-
dential buildings, composed of several smart homes, where
enhanced lighting, energy, heating, air conditioning, and
physical security systems are integrated together to increase
users’ experience (e.g., security, comfort, convenience). Sen-
sors are deployed at different system layers to connect
people with technology, and collect precise and accurate
data on the environment status; actuators and controllers
use these data to manage and adapt the building according
to predefined rules and policies. Assurance as a way to
increase users’ confidence that the smart buildings behave
as expected is a fundamental requirement. Our reference
scenario requires accurate and trustworthy evidence col-
lected by local (wearable) devices that hold properties of
integrity, traceability, verifiability, and privacy, to name but
a few. Trustworthy evidence on local devices can then be
used to produce local claims on the status of a given
object/subsystem under evaluation. Such claims are at the
basis of a process-wide assurance verification, where local
claims are composed in process-wide global claims to verify
the assurance of composite IoT-enabled processes.
III. EVIDENCE COLLECTION ARCHITECTURE
An evidence is a piece of information at the basis of
any assurance process, which can be used to trigger an
action (e.g., fire alarm) or prove a state (e.g., temperature
value). Evidence can come from different sources (e.g.,
sensors, edge nodes, users), have different granularities (e.g.,
single sensor reading, aggregated data, decision), and be of
three types depending on where sources are deployed (e.g.,
private, community, public evidence).
Figure 1 depicts the high-level design of our evidence
collection architecture, which includes the main services
and their relationships. The architecture is mapped on three
layers namely private, consortium and public. The proposed
architecture isolates the content of each layer from the rest
of the network. The coordinators are the only services that
can fully access two layers at a time. Their task is to act
as intermediaries between two layers, performing additional
operations on the collected evidence (e.g., filtering, aggre-
gation) before passing it to the next layer. In the following,
we discuss the three layers.
1) Private layer: It is composed of private smart devices
that collect atomic evidence related to private settings (e.g.,
a smart home) and a coordinator node that have access to
such evidence. The collected evidence refers to a single unit
(e.g., house, machine). Smart devices are part of a private
blockchain network where they store their readings. Each
device digitally signs its readings before sending them to
the private blockchain.
2) Consortium layer: It is composed of i) one or more
coordinators between the private and consortium layers,
ii) one coordinator between the consortium and public
layers, iii) consortium smart devices, and iv) a consortium
blockchain. Services at consortium layer aggregate evidence
coming from the private layer with additional evidence (e.g.,
coming from elevators, building lighting) collected at the
consortium layer based on specific criteria (e.g., location,
organizational boundaries). Similarly to the private layer,
the consortium layer makes use of smart contracts to interact
with the blockchain. The main difference between the private
and consortium layers is the privacy level and the data
granularity; while the private layer keeps detailed records
of every device, they are protected in a private setting and
only their aggregation (unless stated otherwise) is sent up to
the consortium layer.
3) Public layer: It is composed of a public blockchain,
mediated by a coordinator node, which shares the relevant
information. The main purpose of the public layer is to act
as an interface with the external world. There are many
scenarios where some of the evidence collected internally
might be useful or even critical to put on a public ledger.
For instance, in a smart city, any power surplus generated in
a local environment might be submitted for sale on a public
blockchain.
IV. TRUSTWORTHY EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND
EVALUATION
We propose an atomistic approach based on trustworthy
evidence collection as the basis for implementing a trust-
worthy IoT environment, where trustworthy processes and
decisions are employed. Data collected from each smart de-
vice must be first evaluated and then put into service only if
a minimum amount of assurance requirements are addressed.
To this aim, we use blockchain as the data repository that
contains all transactions for trustworthy evidence collection
and evaluation. The state of a blockchain is represented by
a k−v data store BS:k→v, where k is a 35-byte key and
v is an arbitrary sequence of data. In our context, v is the
evidence collected by smart devices at different levels of
abstraction.
The blockchain handles evidence validation and storage
at various degrees using dedicated smart contracts. A smart
contract is composed of a set of data structures that represent
the evidence level, a set of functions that act on the evidence
and define assurance requirements, and a set of emitted
events. Formally, a smart contract is defined as follows.
Definition IV.1 (Smart contract SC). A smart contract SC
is defined as a 3-tuple (D,F , E) where:
• D={Dp, Dg, Dd} models the three contract data struc-
tures, namely, data point, aggregated evidence, decision
evidence (Section IV-A);1
• F={F1, . . . , Fn} represents the function calls acting on
collected evidence (Section IV-B);
• E={E1, . . . , Em} models events emitted during con-
tract execution.
In the following, after presenting the three different data
structures, we discuss four function calls modeling different
collection processes that balance evidence trustworthiness
and system performance.
A. Data structures
A data point is the least amount of evidence and is defined
as follows.
Definition IV.2 (Data point dp). Data point dp is a 5-tuple
dp=(s, n, sf , v, T ), where s is the source submitting the data
point, n is the name of the data point, sf is the store function
(either ES in Definition IV.5 or EC in Definition IV.6), v
is the value of the data point, and T is the time of the data
point recording. Value v can store: i) the specific sensor
reading sr or ii) an error in the form “err code–expected
value–current value” according to sf .
A set of data points can be aggregated to provide more
information (i.e., aggregated evidence) as follows.
Definition IV.3 (Aggregated evidence A). Aggregated ev-
idence A is a 5-tuple A=(I, n, DA, v, T ), where I
is the aggregation time interval, n is the name of the
aggregated evidence, DA is the function data aggregation
(Definition IV.7), v is the aggregated value, and T is the
time of the evidence aggregation.
A set of data points, aggregated evidence, or a decision
evidence itself can be used to produce a decision evidence,
which can be enforced for process automation.
Definition IV.4 (Decision evidence P). Decision evidence P
is a 5-tuple P= (I, n, TD, v, T ), where I is the time interval
considered to generate the evidence, n is the name of the
decision evidence, TD is the decision function (Definition
IV.9), v is the decision value, and T is the time of the
decision evidence.
1When clear from the context, we will use Dp, Dg , and Dd to denote a
set of data points, aggregated evidence, and decision evidence, respectively.
We note that the decision function defines what action to
take based on the input data.
B. Function calls
The adoption of a solution based on blockchain can how-
ever backfire: management of a blockchain is costly, while
a trustworthy evidence collection and evaluation process is
resource demanding. We then need to balance the level of
trustworthiness we want to achieve and the performance
of evidence collection/evaluation. To the aim of balancing
trust and performance, we define different function calls
supporting different levels of trustworthiness, which differs
on the amount of computations done on chain.
1) Trustworthy evidence store: Trustworthy evidence
store uses the blockchain to simply store observables col-
lected by smart devices.
Definition IV.5 (ES). Function Evidence Store ES:sr →
dp takes as input a sensor reading sr and produces as output
a data point dp that is stored in blockchain BS.
Example IV.1. In a smart home, sensor data can be stored
following a predefined time interval or can be triggered by
specific events. For instance, an energy consumption sensor
can periodically send power consumption values to the
blockchain, including the sensor id, the data key, and the data
value (e.g., {Sensor123, power consumption, 10w/h})
2) Trustworthy evidence collection: Trustworthy evi-
dence collection extends trustworthy evidence store (Defini-
tion IV.5) by defining a function that validates the collected
evidence against assurance requirements before adding it to
the blockchain.
Definition IV.6 (EC). Function Evidence Collection EC:
sr × req → dp takes as input a sensor reading sr and
a Boolean expression of assurance requirements req, and
produces as output a data point dp that is stored in the
blockchain BS.
We note that an assurance requirement is a term of the
form (a op v), with a an attribute, op ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}
a comparison operator, and v the expected value/threshold
for the specific sensor reading sr. For instance, assur-
ance requirement (power consumption ≤ 10w/h) restricts
the domain of valid sensor readings; assurance require-
ments (timestamp − current datetime ≤ 1hour) and
(pending updates = null) restrict the domain of valid
sensor readings to those coming from updated devices and
measured in the last hour. Evidence validation is done on
chain and only those data readings that are successfully
validated against the specified requirements are stored as
valid data points in the blockchain; otherwise, an error data
point with prefix “err” is stored, specifying the reason why
the assurance requirement has not been met. This provides
a higher level of trustworthiness, since it permits to track
all data points that have satisfied or not the assurance
requirements.
Example IV.2. Following example IV.1, when the data
coming from the sensor are submitted to the smart con-
tract, assurance requirements are checked before stor-
ing the transaction. For instance, assurance requirement
(power consumption ≤ 10w/h) is checked every time the
evidence collection function is invoked.
3) Trustworthy data aggregation: Trustworthy data ag-
gregation supports the calculation of specific metrics directly
in the blockchain. It defines a function called data aggre-
gation that extends the evidence collection function (Def-
inition IV.6) with trustworthy evidence aggregation. This
approach substantially increases privacy, since it permits to
hide details about the single data points, while keeping the
possibility to track back data to its origin.
Definition IV.7 (DA). Function data aggregation DA:
Dp × op → A takes as input a set of data
points Dp={dp1 , dp2 , . . . , dpn}, the aggregation opera-
tor op∈{sum, average,min,max, count}, and produces as
output the aggregated evidence A=op(Dp) that is stored in
blockchain BS.
Example IV.3. The building power consumption is an
aggregation (e.g., average, sum) of the power consumption
of all smart homes plus any power consumed by the shared
services (e.g., elevator, stairs lighting). To maintain a high
level of privacy, while supporting full traceability of data,
function data aggregation uses the data recorded by the
single sensors but only exposes an aggregated version of
the data.
4) Trustworthy decision: Trustworthy decision provides
the highest level of trustworthiness, at high costs. The whole
process from data point collection to decision making is
subject to a smart contract and executed on chain. The
decision making process is recorded into the blockchain to
increase transparency and traceability, following a decision
smart contract that triggers a specific decision when col-
lected evidence satisfies a (set of) condition. We first define
a decision function as follows.
Definition IV.8 (df ). Function df is a membership function
that takes as input a set D of evidence and returns as output
a decision, according to a set of conditions in the form (attr
op value), with op ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥} . It assumes the
following form:
df(D) =
 decision1 if condition1decision2 if condition2
decision3 if condition3
The trustworthy decision function takes as input a set
of evidence with the corresponding decision function, and
provides as output the decision evidence.
Definition IV.9 (TD). Function Trustworthy Decision TD:
D × df → P takes as input a set D of evidence (see
Definition IV.1), a decision function df , and produces as
output the decision evidence P=df(D) that is stored in
blockchain BS.
Example IV.4. A decision function can reduce the house
lighting when the power consumption level reaches a certain
threshold. The sensor reading (i.e., current power consump-
tion), the condition, and the decision (i.e., reduce lighting)
are all stored on chain.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We experimentally evaluated the performance of our
evidence collection approach using a virtual machine with
20 vCPUs Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 @ 2.40GHz and 64GB
RAM and Hyperledger fabric blockchain as a permissioned
blockchain environment [10].
We configured a test network composed of 4 organiza-
tions, each one including two endorsing peers (they host
ledgers and smart contracts) and one orderer node used to
generate the new blocks of evidence in the blockchain. Each
pair of organizations share one channel with the total of
3 channels, corresponding to the public, consortium, and
private blockchains in Figure 1. Each channel specified
relevant smart contracts (chaincode), mapping the different
function calls in Section IV-B. Contract 1.1 refers to function
Evidence Store ES in Definition IV.5; Contract 1.2 refers
to function Evidence Collection EC in Definition IV.5;
Contract 2.1 refers to function Data Aggregation DA in
Definition IV.7; Contract 3.1 refers to function Trustworthy
Decision TD in Definition IV.9.
We evaluated the performance of our network measuring
the throughput and average latency retrieved by executing
portions of our methodology (i.e., evidence validation, ag-
gregation, decision) on chain. All the tests have been done
varying the transactions per second (smart contract execution
requests) in tps=100, 200, 300, 400, 500. This configuration
permitted to evaluate the scalability of the network modeling
an increasing number of systems interacting with it. The
results discussed in this section represent the average over
5 executions of the experiments.
First, we compared the performance of Contracts 1.1
and 1.2 using transactions that trigger write operations
on the blockchain. Our results show that Contract 1.2,
requiring data point validation, decreases the throughput
and increases the average latency with respect to Contract
1.1. The throughput is the same for tps=100, while it is
decreased of 1.6% for tps=200, 2.9% for tps=300, 3.0%
for tps=400, and 3.1% for tps=500. The average latency
is increased in all scenarios: 11% for tps=100, 20% for
tps=200, 16.6% for tps=300, 9.6% for tps=400, 12.2%
for tps=500.
Figure 2 presents the transaction latency of our approach
for Contracts 1.2, 2.1, 3.1. It also presents the read latency
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Figure 2. Performance evaluation: (a) throughput, (b) average latency
when querying the fabric network. In both cases, we varied
the number of tps to evaluate how the latency changes.
The transaction latency takes in consideration the time from
when a transaction is submitted till it is available in the
network. The read latency instead is calculated from when a
request is submitted till a reply is received [11]. We note
that, independently from the selected contract, when we
increase tps, a decrease of the throughput (Figure 2(a)) and
an increase of the average latency (Figure 2(b)) are observed.
Concerning the performance difference between different
contracts, let us consider the worst scenario of tps=500 with
Contract 1.2 as our baseline. With respect to the baseline:
i) the aggregation of the evidence on chain (Contract 2.1)
decreases the throughput of 22.5% and increases the average
latency of 38%; ii) the decision on chain (Contract 2.2)
decreases the throughput of 39.6% and increases the average
latency of 56.4%.
To conclude, our results show that the selected level of
trustworthiness (contract) introduces a not-negligible cost in
terms of performance, while it has less impact on resource
consumption. This suggests the importance of selecting the
proper level of trustworthiness for the domain of interest to
keep the overall performance under control.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a trustworthy evidence collection method-
ology based on blockchain and smart contracts supporting
a sound IoT assurance evaluation. Trustworthy evidence
collection is provided at different granularities balancing the
level of trustworthiness and performance of its execution.
Evidence collection ranges from simple trustworthy evidence
collection, to trustworthy evidence aggregation, and provable
evidence-based automation.
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